"Das musikalische Hören" in the Middle Ages and Renaissance: Perspectives from Pre-War Germany

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"*Zeitgeist*," a colleague of mine jokingly suggested a few days ago, as he picked up the latest arrival in our periodicals room. It was a special issue of the German ethnomusicology journal *World of Music*, devoted to cultural concepts of hearing and listening in popular and non-Western musical traditions.[1] Only four months previously, the British journal *Early Music* had printed a special volume on listening practice, with studies ranging from the twelfth to the eighteenth centuries. That volume, in turn, had appeared only two months after the symposium "Music as Heard: Listeners and Listening in Late-Medieval and Early Modern Europe, 1300–1600" was held at Princeton University, on 27–28 September 1997. The proceedings of the latter event are now published here, in this special issue of *The Musical Quarterly*. Altogether the three special issues, published in Germany, Britain, and the United States within the span of less than a year, have yielded nearly three dozen new studies of music listening in cross-cultural and historical perspective.

Zeitgeist? It would indeed appear so, for the 1990s must count as (if nothing else) the decade in which musicology rediscovered music listening—as being more than a mere postlude to the compositional process, more than just a receptive disposition orchestrated by the composer along with the musical work itself. Listening, rather, is seen as itself a creative activity: as that dimension of a musical culture where the relevance of such concepts as "compositional process," "reception," "composer," and "work" may well be determined in the first place. (For example, if there is no conception of "the composer" in the horizon of expectations of a particular group of listeners, it might be historically inappropriate to insist on its centrality in describing the musical tradition of which they are a part.) Thus to reconceive and revalue music listening is to suggest at least the theoretical possibility of a complete turnaround in methodological orientation for musicology, maybe even, as one author put it, a Copernican rev-

olution.[2] Perhaps such claims are too radical, but the question of listening does seem to offer a constructive way out of the current debate between work- and author-centered approaches and their critiques, a debate that is in danger of becoming increasingly stale. Already it has opened up new and unexpected insights into musical cultures that had otherwise seemed almost too neatly cataloged and categorized for credibility.

All this is not to deny, of course, that many important contributions to the question of music listening were made before the 1990s; in fact, I will argue below that pioneering research was undertaken in Germany as early as the 1920s. However, what is so remarkable about the current upsurge of interest is not just the increasing numbers of studies that are appearing simultaneously, but the extent to which different authors seem to be pursuing identical approaches independently from one another. If footnotes are anything to go by, scholars do not appear to be at great pains to point to existing research—especially if it concerns other historical periods or was published in a different language. True, the scholarship of Leon Botstein, Peter Gay, and James H. Johnson (all on listening in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) has attracted a great deal of interest in the discipline at large,[3] but there are many other fine studies that continue to be cited only very infrequently. The most likely explanation for this, I think, is that for the majority of scholars the question of listening has emerged directly from the particular historical materials on which they happen to be working. The idea of framing the issue in a broader theoretical perspective, and of making comparisons across historical and cultural boundaries, may not become part of their priorities until later. Now that the 1990s are drawing to a close, however, it is precisely this latter idea that seems to have inspired the collective enterprises that resulted in the special issues of *Early Music*, *World of Music*, and *The Musical Quarterly*. The study of music listening is entering into a new phase.

As far as medieval and early modern music is concerned, two recent publications have been particularly important in reopening the subject. The first is a collection of essays entitled *The Second Sense: Studies in Hearing and Musical Judgement From Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century*, published in 1991 by the Warburg Institute, London.[4] Although the authors focused chiefly on intellectual and theoretical traditions, from Aristotle to Mengoli, and were not generally concerned with music listening in society at large, their work will remain indispensable to scholarship on the subject for a long time to come.

The controversy generated by Christopher Page's *Discarding Images: Reflections on Music and Culture in Medieval France*, which was published in 1993, has forced the issue of music listening onto the agenda in a much more publicly visible way.[5] It is a thought-provoking and challenging book, not

least because of the author's tendency to draw upon his own performing and listening experience in motivating his effort to discard received images of medieval music and culture (many of which do indeed take little account of performing and listening). Critics of *Discarding Images* have expressed discomfort with the fact that Page's experience appears to be presented as a source of interpretive authority rather than as a heuristic tool.[6] However, subsequent debates have also highlighted the chief virtue of *Discarding Images*. By problematizing listening and performing experience, Page has challenged other scholars (as well as himself) to look for historical evidence bearing on the problem. This has had a tremendous impact, for instance, on our understanding of a fifteenth-century author like Johannes Tinctoris, who is beginning to emerge as a far more aesthetically sensitive writer than was previously thought.[7] Whatever the problems of *Discarding Images*, it has made a palpable contribution to effecting the shift in orientation mentioned above, and its impact on the discipline has proved richly beneficial.

As said before, however, it would be wrong to claim that the question of music listening in the late Middle Ages and early modern period was first discovered in the 1990s. In the following contribution I will show that it became a major historiographical issue for German musicologists in the 1920s. Two scholars in particular, Arnold Schering (1877–1941) and Heinrich Besseler (1900–1969), took the lead in exploring the topic. Between 1922 and 1928 they published several pioneering essays on music listening in the *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters*, work that still bears reading today.[8] It is true that there has been little follow-up to these early initiatives. For a combination of reasons, research of this kind never developed into the sort of vigorous scholarly tradition on which one might confidently build today. Whereas one could scarcely afford now to deal with matters of, say, compositional process or performance practice without keeping up with a substantial and ever-growing body of pertinent literature, the question of music listening still leads us into relatively unfamiliar terrain. While it would be unproductive to dwell on the historical reasons for that neglect—they probably have much to do with the rigorous scientific empiricism of Anglo-American musicology during the postwar decades[9]—we can only expect to profit from engaging with the scholarship of those who first explored that terrain, viewing our present endeavors, as it were, in a broader historical perspective.

The Reaction to Riemann

It is probably no coincidence that music listening came to be regarded as a problematic issue precisely in the years of the Weimar Republic. Of the

two scholars mentioned earlier, Besseler in particular emphasized the radical changes in the intellectual and musical climate of the time. Jazz, modernism, and the early-music revival posed new challenges to old musicological certainties, and the "crisis of historicism" profoundly affected the German humanities in the years following World War I.[10] The implications of all this for music historiography could only be far-reaching, as Besseler predicted in the opening pages of his article "Grundfragen der Musikästhetik," published in 1927: "It should not be overlooked that history today means something different from what it did even twenty years ago; that it has, in general, become a problematic undertaking of the first order. Instead of the one-dimensional development of music that used to be postulated, our fundamental outlook now beholds a plurality of equal historical periods, which are not even meaningfully comparable as to their intrinsic value, and the idea of the timeless, eternally changeless Musically Beautiful has lost its appeal; it must be the task of musical aesthetics to draw consequences from this. The time of Systems is past."[11] Besseler obviously alluded here to *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, the tremendously influential treatise on musical autonomy by Eduard Hanslick (1825–1904), which had opened with the sentence "The time of those aesthetic systems is past, which have considered the Beautiful only in relation to the feelings that are stirred by it."[12] Hanslick had indeed postulated the Musically Beautiful as an aesthetic quality transcending all historical and cultural difference: ideally, for him, its apprehension by listeners would be similarly timeless. If differences could nevertheless be observed between ways of hearing in diverse historical periods—and Hanslick did not deny that this was the case—then these were attributable to the type of listening against which his polemic was targeted: the sentimental indulgence in feelings.[13]

When it came to music listening, however, Besseler seems to have been concerned less with Hanslick than he was with Hugo Riemann (1849–1919) and his influential *Lehre der Tonvorstellungen*. Conceived as a universal theory of how the human mind organizes the perception of pitch and rhythm, Riemann's doctrine of "tone representations" was bound to attract the criticism of the young scholar, precisely for failing to allow for cultural and historical variation. In the opening sentences of his article "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens" (1925), Besseler did not mince words:

> When Hugo Riemann wrote his doctoral dissertation *Über das musikalische Hören* of 1873, he stood within the blissfully self-evident [framework] of a closed musical tradition. In those days a theme of such general scope could still lead straight into fundamental questions of classic-romantic

> harmony . . . In the meantime the musical situation has changed too deeply. A closed tradition is no longer available . . . Indeed the current engagement with foreign musical cultures differs from the romantic Palestrina and Bach movements precisely in this regard, that we lack the naive certainty to assimilate past things to modern conventions with a clear conscience.[14]

What Besseler had in mind with this "naive certainty" may have been pronouncements by Riemann like the following: "[that] we have every reason to assume that the difference between the mode of listening during the past millenia and that of today is negligible, and to meet everything that appears to lend itself to shattering that foundation with serious mistrust."[15] This is a highly interesting statement, for in a sense, its very defensiveness suggests that Riemann's position had been neither very certain nor particularly naive. Precisely in attempting to exorcise the possibility that his theory might be shaken altogether, he admits that this is in fact a thinkable prospect and implicitly affirms how much is at stake in making assumptions about music listening in past historical periods. Riemann appears to be in no doubt as to the foundational significance of such assumptions, to which he assigns an epistemological status analogous to that of the modern paradigm—that is, a postulate that structures empirical observation but cannot itself be legitimated by means of empirical observation. In this regard his position is not necessarily weaker than that of any scholar today who denounces the paradigm of aesthetic autonomy.[16] More importantly, and as Besseler later came to recognize,[17] the *problem* of music listening in history had already emerged within Riemann's work, long before the challenges of modernism, early music, and jazz forced it onto the agenda in the 1920s.

Gebrauchsmusik

In the remainder of "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," Besseler proposed a radically different approach to the whole issue. First, he went straight to the heart of the matter by launching a vehement critique of the public concert and the cultural values associated with it. He then went on to formulate a rationale for modes of musical activity that are not conditioned by this modern institution. These Besseler grouped together under the heading of "functional music" (*Gebrauchsmusik*): dance, work and community songs, church music, children's songs, mythical and magical songs, and so on. Besseler's observations on *Gebrauchsmusik* are kept in very general terms and are almost totally lacking in documentary support. Yet he does succeed in sketching an

explanatory model of listening that is internally consistent and that meaningfully relates a number of phenomena that are well known to us from the study of late medieval music. Here, for instance, are some of his observations on the apparent absence of "attentive listening" in *Gebrauchsmusik*: "One immediately notices in the attitude of a dancer, or even of a directly participating spectator, that music is not in any way central to him. He listens only with half an ear . . . And just as the distance between music and listeners to which we are accustomed seems to be lacking here, so the otherwise firmly delineated individuals fuse in a sort of rhythmic-vital collective state of being [*Kollektivdasein*], through which the music flows as a connecting fluid. It goes without saying that a mere observer does not have the appropriate mode of access to this music, precisely in that he does not 'join in'."[18] This notion of *Kollektivdasein* as a state of being in which the boundaries of self/other and music/audience dissolve was inspired by the teachings of Besseler's philosophy professor at Freiburg, Martin Heidegger.[19] In Besseler's description, *Kollektivdasein* seems to stand for a rather idealized, almost fairy-tale state of musicianship in the German countryside, unspoilt by modern society and ironically transcending history in much the same way as music listening had done in Riemann's theory. On the other hand, one cannot deny Besseler's views a certain explanatory force. In particular, the passage quoted above reminds one of the well-known fact that medieval depictions of music making, almost as a rule, do not show anyone actually listening (with maybe the occasional exception of a child or a dog in the margin).[20] People just seem to be going about their business, dancing, eating, laughing, working, praying—anything except visibly noticing music or musicians. This is in striking contrast with the pictorial convention of "the listener" and "the audience" in nineteenth-century genre painting to which Peter Gay has drawn attention.[21]

Besseler did not seek to explain this particular historical contrast, yet his approach seems relevant in hindsight in that he focused on the totality of the social event and took this to be the unit of reference rather than the music as a self-contained entity. One important consequence of this was the fundamental revaluation of the concept of "attentive listening." If we take that concept to mean the filtering out of stimuli other than those pertaining to the musical performance, then attentive listening may appear positive in terms of the music itself (which thus becomes construed as objectlike, or *gegenständlich*, to quote Besseler), but negative in terms of the social event, from which an attentive listener effectively withdraws. Besseler's explanatory model, in other words, reversed the terms on which music listening in the past might be evaluated: attentive listening (and its corollary "musical object")

became redefined as exceptions from a postulated norm of collective engagement and participation.

As an aside, I am not suggesting that the notion of attentive listening would have been totally unknown in the late Middle Ages. However, outside of the church (where it was simply deemed sinful), it does seem to have been regarded as something quite extraordinary and unusual. To mention just one example: in one manuscript version of the fifteenth-century prose romance *Apollonius de Tyr,* the valiant and handsome young knight Apollonius, staying incognito at the court of King Architrates, "jouoyt en sa harp si tresdoulx virelaiz que tous ceulx de leans *laissoyent toutes choses pour l'escouter*."[22] Obviously courtly society would grind to a halt if something like this was meant to occur every time music was being performed; the point here is precisely that Apollonius's performance was exceptional. Earlier on in the same scene, the knight had wept when listening to a ballade performed by the king's daughter, for "il entendoit bien la chanson que la damoiselle qu'elle avoit jouée devant luy." Apollonius's emotive response, triggered by private recollections, is inexplicable to the others and tellingly underlines his isolation as an incognito stranger at the court. An attentive listener, then, is someone who fails to participate, who withdraws, whose behavior could even be suggestive of dark secrets and hidden pasts.[23]

What were the implications of this explanatory model for the music itself? Besseler summarized the answer in a passage that reads almost like a textbook description of an oral musical culture, calling into question any notion of work, canon, or author: "*Gebrauchsmusik* knows no yardstick of eternity, is not created with a view to permanence to begin with. It is at its most lively precisely when it originates in the moment and for the moment. Improvisation, or the breaking down and alteration of well-trodden paths, are appropriate procedures here, which have also experienced a renewal in jazz. The composer recedes completely, name and person are of no interest. He carries on his business as a craft or trade, without attaching value to originality."[24] It is hard not to sense regret that this explanatory model, formulated as early as 1925, has not been more influential in medieval and Renaissance musicology than it became. Perhaps this is due to the radicalism of Besseler's vision, which almost immediately generated hostility among some of his colleagues. Hans Joachim Moser, in his essay "Zwischen Kultur und Zivilisation der Musik" (1926), scathingly suggested that Besseler had hailed "the *thé dansant* with nigger music as the distinguishing characteristic of a newly emerging 'true' musical epoch" and hinted at possible Bolshevik sympathies behind the the young scholar's critique of the modern concert, taking it to spell the death sentence for German symphonic art.[25] Besseler

was stung not only by Moser's response but also by a review of Alfred Einstein in the *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* (1926–27).[26] Although it would be wrong to suggest that he retreated from his position, his later work contains only faint echoes of the radicalism he had expressed in the 1920s. Other scholars seem to have applied his explanatory model mostly to *Gebrauchsmusik* in the lowbrow sense, with the arbitrary effect of segregating it almost completely from the "mainstream" history of major composers and masterpieces. Besseler himself, however, had envisaged a far wider applicability: "However, music history demonstrates the noteworthy fact that even the leading art music is very often determined purely in terms of social interaction, and that interactive musicianship generally dominates much larger areas and historical periods than autonomously fashioned music, which features only incidentally."[27]

Inductive Esthesics

In the second section of his essay Besseler sketched a tentative history of music listening in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, following an approach that Jean-Jacques Nattiez has described as "inductive esthesics."[28] This is to infer, from an analysis of the style or make-up of a composition, the mode of listening that it seems to call for, or that seems proper to it. Arnold Schering had previously adopted the same approach in his article "Über Musikhören und Musikempfinden im Mittelalter" (1922), and we also find it much later in Besseler's own *Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit* (1959) and Karl Gustav Fellerer's "Der Wandel des musikalischen Hörens im 16. Jahrhundert" (1962).[29]

While the approach is valuable and probably indispensable, it does carry a risk of circularity. For, failing independent corroboration of inferences about "how people must have heard this work," the only evidence to support those inferences may be the work as one has construed it. Conclusions of this kind, therefore, may be vulnerable to the charge that they amount to no more than hidden projections of a priori analytic assumptions.[30] Two assumptions in particular need mentioning.

The first has to do with the orality-literacy paradigms. Since modern analysis is essentially a readerly act, analytical inferences about listening are in danger of being conditioned by a fundamentally literate mindset. One senses this problem, for instance, in Schering's essay, when he comments, about parallel organum, "Just contemplate the difficulty of the very simplest case: that a singer in 950 would have been forced, without notation, aided only by his hearing, to improvise a countervoice, according to the rules, against a sounding principal voice."[31] Now

it could be argued (and often has been, on the basis of ethnographic research) that singing in parallels is in fact almost impossible to *avoid* when several people are singing "the same" tune from memory—although hearing the result as consisting of distinct "parts" is quite another matter.[32] Hence one might just as well describe the difficulty as follows: that a monk writing a treatise in the tenth century would have been forced, without notation, aided only by his education, to identify and conceptualize such notions as "polyphony," "principal voice," "countervoice," or indeed "rules."

For later periods, too, the articles by Schering, Besseler, and Fellerer leave one feeling that analytical inferences about music listening have a tendency to end up replicating conventional narratives of compositional history. The basic model they seem to affirm is that of major creative individuals whose bold stylistic innovations forced contemporary audiences to listen to music in new ways.[33] This, of course, is not so much to write a history of "how people listened" as to subsume it under the history of "how composers wrote," or rather, how we construe what composers wrote. For predominantly oral musical cultures (in which I would include fifteenth-century Europe),[34] it may not amount to a convincing history of listening at all.

A related problem arises when the appropriate mode of listening is postulated to be in some sense analytical, and the analysis itself involves such spatial metaphors as form, structure, symmetry, and so on. Here, too, listening is virtually predestined to become construed as an essentially literate, visual, composer- and work-centered activity.[35] This interpretation has become particularly influential in Renaissance music analysis since the 1960s, due mainly, it seems, to the Schenkerian concept of "structural hearing." In her critique of that concept, Rose Rosengard Subotnik hinted at the price musicology may be paying for subordinating the ear to the eye: "The ideal of structural listening has made our perceptions and analytical concerns as musicologists almost completely dependent on scores, as if the latter were books. One is tempted to argue that structural listening makes more use of the eyes than of the ears. Certainly, to an important extent structural listening can take place in the mind through intelligent score-reading, without the physical presence of an external sound-source. But whereas the absence of concrete sound constitutes a debatable loss in the case of literature, it represents nothing less than a catastrophic sacrifice for music."[36]

The second analytic assumption is more deep-seated. It is the very belief that there exists such a singular thing as "the" mode of listening that a composition calls for, or is proper to it, that it is somehow built into the musical text and can be recovered from it through an act of

analysis. This assumption need not be problematic, say, when a particular repertory meets with prejudice on the part of modern hearers, and one seeks to explain how the music might make sense to them with a different way of listening. On the other hand, it has not been unknown for Renaissance musicologists, even to this day, to give both colleagues and nonspecialists a guilty conscience about music they already enjoy, by decreeing on analytical or theoretical grounds that "this is the correct way to hear it."[37]

At this point I cannot resist mentioning yet another essay that originated in the intellectual ferment of 1920s Germany, Günther Stern's "Zur Phänomenologie des Zuhörens (erläutert am Hören impressionistischer Musik)," published in 1927.[38] Stern theorized here about a mode of listening appropriate to musical impressionism and argued that both attentive listening (*Zuhören*) and such readerly acts as following or analyzing the score are fundamentally incompatible with it. Yet he was modest about the epistemological claims that could be made for his proposed mode of listening. In his own words, Stern aspired to establish no more than the "point of [aural] access" (*Zugang*) that was "least hampered by fundamental difficulties of realization immanent in the music."[39] Why this circumspection? Stern formulated the basic problem in terms with which few postmodernists today would quarrel: "To begin with, it is open to question (in terms of historical ontology) that a historical object should always possess one (and only one) point of access. Is not the inappropriateness of seeking a *single*, privileged point of access demonstrated by the two facts, [first] that historical material—despite the most widely differing points of access—*endures*, and [second] that this enduring constitutes the very historicity of the historical object?"[40] One could illustrate this point with the help of Besseler's explanatory model. If the totality of the social event, rather than the musical work itself, is the principal unit of reference, then it follows that musical works would have been made to accommodate the venues in which they were performed, rather than the other way round. Hence musical texts would likely undergo adaptation and revision as they traveled from one type of venue to another.[41] Still, one might be able to show that some notion of "the" proper mode of listening must have existed in the late Middle Ages, if it turned out that contemporary observers disapproved of such adaptation and considered musical works to be intrinsically unsuited to venues other than the kinds for which they had been written. Yet the opposite is the case, of course. This was the period, after all, when a composer like Jacob Obrecht could write a cantus firmus Mass whose Benedictus (written to be sung during Elevation) might end up circulating for decades as an independent piece for domestic, public, and courtly

consumption, retexted in chansonniers, and arranged for keyboard and lute in tablatures. If one can speak of any "proper" mode of listening at all, then surely it could only have been the one proper to whatever the occasion or venue happened to be (provided the music was appropriate to that occasion or venue in the first place). Ironically, then, to posit a single, putatively authentic mode of listening, transcending time, place, and context, is to project a demonstrably anachronistic paradigm on late medieval music.

Stern, in the passage cited above, pointed to this when he spoke of historical objects having endured (and being valued for their historicity) "despite the most widely differing points of access." Similarly, Arnold Schering, in 1922, had stressed that "a distance of fifty years is enough for the meaning of a composition to appear transformed through the prism of the changed inner life [of the time], and this difference is even more noticeable—indeed amounts to a total reinterpretation—when centuries lie between."[42] Not surprisingly, he rejected the ideal of authentic performances, "if such are at all conceivable," as "practically implausible."[43]

One issue that keeps coming back in all of this, it seems, is how difficult it is to prevent modern notions of listening from creeping into the very conclusions one would like to draw about other musical cultures. This is why Besseler's critique of the modern concert seems, in hindsight, such a remarkably perceptive move. As he rightly perceived, the concert is a powerful homogenizer when it comes to engaging with repertories from historically diverse cultures and ambiences. Like radio, television, and the high-fidelity stereo set, it puts a frame around the musics for which it serves as a medium—a frame whose immediate effect is to enforce the identification of context as a dimension extrinsic to "the music itself."[44] It is the very possibility of such a frame that Besseler eliminated with his *Gebrauchsmusik* model. One potential danger with inductive aesthesics, on the other hand, is that the scholar may be operating within the confines of such a frame without realizing it. After all, the modern edition is yet another powerful homogenizer, which streamlines the most diverse musical manifestations of the past into a single typographical idea of "the music itself."

Besseler's late study *Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit* (1959), which explores the history of music listening from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, provides an example of this. One could well describe this essay as essentially a history of musical style, interlaced with inferences about modes of listening appropriate to each style phase. Besseler presented this as a history of music listening, but one might with equal justification regard it as a guide for the modern concertgoer or CD buyer,

with advice on how to adjust one's ear on turning from one historical piece to the next. For there is an underlying premise in this essay according to which there was always a direct, one-to-one relationship between musical object and listening subject, with minimal if any consideration of context. If Besseler did not arrive at conclusions that might present a challenge to the kinds of settings in which music from the past is heard and studied today, it is because these settings seem to have conditioned the very framework of his inquiry. One senses with disappointment that Besseler allowed his later work to become symptomatic of the very problem he had so courageously diagnosed in 1925.

"How People *Actually* Listened"

What lessons can we hope to learn from this? It seems to me that all the problems discussed in this essay may come down to only a single one. Just as it is possible to put a frame around "the music itself," there is a danger of putting a frame around "music listening" even before a single piece of evidence has been evaluated. I am referring to the belief that there exists such a thing as "how people *actually* listened." This belief is not itself subject to proof or disproof, and I will not attempt to endorse or refute it here. "How people actually listened" is one of those things, like Ranke's "wie es eigentlich gewesen" (or indeed "the music itself"), that dwell in the realm of metaphysical truth, knowable only to God. However, a serious fallacy arises when that truth is proclaimed or presumed to be the goal of research on music listening. This is to burden musicology with the task of solving a nonempirical problem by empirical means—the problem being: what does it mean for people to *actually* listen?

This is properly a philosophical question, of course, and so long as it remains unresolved, empirical means will by definition be powerless to prove anything. For no amount of historical evidence, however patiently collected and evaluated, could ever prevent the question from being asked again: "But how sure are you that this is how people *actually* heard this music?" It is in this infinite regress that one can recognize the metaphysical nature of the truth: it will elude humankind forever. And it is in the potential for all evidence to be thrown out of court that one can recognize the Procrustean frame: the very expression "how people actually listened" involves an a priori demarcation between the ultimate privacy of the listener's mind and the putative layers of falsification that are seen to envelop it. Few activities, from this perspective, could seem more futile than inductive aesthesics, at least if it is meant to deduce "the way

people actually listened" from a reading of "the music itself." Something is missing from this equation, and the breakthrough in 1990s scholarship, I would argue, may have much to do with its revaluation. It is the layers of falsification—or, to put it more generously, the discursive practices in which "listening" and "the music" are enmeshed.

Let me illustrate this with the help of a recent monograph by Nicholas Cook, *Music, Imagination, and Culture*.[45] Cook dwells on the distinction between "how people listen" and how they have been educated and socialized to rationalize their musical experience. A large part of his book is devoted to demonstrating, on the basis of introspection as well as the results of empirical tests, that the "ordinary listener" does not always hear music the way it is said to be heard in our culture. From these observations Cook proceeds to a general claim that there is a universal discrepancy between how music is experienced and how it is imagined and described. This discrepancy lies at the basis of his definition of "musical culture" as essentially a repertoire of means for imagining music: "it is the specific pattern of divergences between the experience of music on the one hand, and the images by means of which it is represented on the other, that gives a musical culture its identity" (p. 4).

Having adopted this notion of a universal discrepancy, Cook proceeds to criticize those scholars who do not presuppose its existence in their research. He argues, for instance, that "the failure to distinguish between what a given culture rationalizes and what is of musical significance in its productions necessarily leads to a fundamental misunderstanding as to the nature of the musical enterprise" (p. 238). However, this obviously begs the question of who or what is capable of deciding what is "musically significant" without perpetuating culturally determined modes of rationalization in turn. The crucial methodological problem for the music historian is apparent in the example Cook invokes, that of Machaut's compositional process. He calls attention to the hypothesis that medieval composers assembled their polyphony one line at a time, and that they (and contemporary listeners) were allegedly indifferent to the succession of vertical sonorities that emerged as a result.[46] Cook rejects this theory, and its apparent implications for how fourteenth-century music was heard, as *prima facie* "hard to imagine," and he quotes a major Machaut scholar who made similar appeals to what is "conceivable" in this connection. However, if this amounts to successfully distinguishing "between what a culture rationalizes and what is of musical significance in its productions," then the musical thought current in Machaut's time can be dismissed whenever it happens not to concur with what the modern scholar is capable of imagining—and thus a new layer of falsification is being identified.

Underlying these difficulties is the fundamental uncertainty as to whether such a thing as "the musical experience itself" actually exists. Cook can only demonstrate its existence by showing that it is different from ways of rationalizing it, but this requires him to rationalize it as well. His argument thus depends on the assumption that the way people listen is *not* different from the way he is rationalizing it, and hence that his book is exempt from the very claims it makes about all musical cultures. Reviewers have not been uniformly persuaded that it enjoys this distinction: to them, Cook's idea of an immediate, unreflective, pleasure-oriented mode of listening that transcends all cultural specificity seemed only too culturally specific.[47] Paradoxically, then, *Music, Imagination, and Culture* only ends up illustrating the point that there is no way to escape culturally determined means of rationalizing music, no access to any absolute standard of truth by which to judge particular repertoires of means, whether they be ours or Machaut's.

The central insight underlying the upsurge of interest in music listening in the 1990s is the logical corollary to this: that musical activity is implicated in a network of discursive practices so powerful as to problematize any notion of "the music itself" or "how people actually listen."[48] Hence it is the discursive practices—writings, documents, images, manuscripts—on which current research has begun to focus with unprecedented intensity, to understand and explore just how different cultures and historical periods construed and valued these notions. If any study of listening in the Middle Ages had to be singled out as an example of the new turn scholarship has taken, my choice would be Christopher Page's "Listening to the Trouvères."[49] After all the comments made above, it might seem nearly impossible to avoid running into methodological problems when embarking on research of this kind, yet Page's article makes one wonder what could be easier. He is not concerned either to depart from or react against modern ideas about listening, nor is his research compromised by arbitrary standards of "objective" truth (whether it be analytic "validity" or some preconceived idea of "how people listen"), for his goal is to recover and understand the thirteenth century's own discursive practices about listening, and his approach is to bring together and evaluate a wide range of literary, visual, and documentary material bearing on the issue. Page's reading has brought to light several priceless gems of historical evidence, and within the space of less than twenty pages he succeeds in sketching out a discursive universe that is fascinating in and of itself—irrespective of its relationship to modern ways of engaging with thirteenth-century music.

One senses from pathbreaking articles like this, and from the promise they hold for future research, that 1990s musicology is not in danger of reinventing the wheel; on the contrary, what has been taking

place represents a genuine conceptual breakthrough. Looking back on previous scholarship, we now see that the methodological problems discussed above were not inherent in the question of music listening as such but were associated rather with certain presuppositions that the question was never allowed to problematize. (The tenacity of these presuppositions may partly explain why historical research on music listening, although pioneered as far back as the 1920s, never really took off as a subject.) Now that these and other presuppositions have come under challenge for different reasons, the question itself has vigorously reemerged and appears to us in a new light. The scholarly energies it is capable of generating today are amply illustrated by the overwhelming response to the symposium "Music As Heard." It is hoped that the proceedings of that event, brought together in this special issue of *The Musical Quarterly*, will encourage and inspire others to take the question further, into new areas and directions.

Notes

1. *World of Music* 39 (1997). For the next sentence, see *Early Music* 25 (1997).

2. James Obelkevich, "In Search of the Listener," *Journal of the Royal Musical Association* 114 (1989): 108: "What this implies is a kind of Copernican revolution in our approach to the history of music—a shift from a supply-centred account, with the listeners revolving in distant orbit around the professionals, to a consumption-centred account, with listeners not just left in but at the heart of things." For the next sentence, see Leo Treitler, "Postmodern Signs in Musical Studies," *Journal of Musicology* 13 (1995): 3–17, esp. 11–17.

3. Leon Botstein, "Listening Through Reading: Musical Literacy and the Concert Audience," *Nineteenth-Century Music* 16 (1992): 129–45; James H. Johnson, *Listening in Paris: A Cultural History* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1995); and Peter Gay, *The Naked Heart* (New York: Norton, 1995), 11–35.

4. Ed. Charles Burnett, Michael Fend, and Penelope Gouk (London: The Warburg Institute, 1991).

5. Christopher Page, *Discarding Images: Reflections on Music and Culture in Medieval France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

6. Margaret Bent, "Reflections on Christopher Page's *Reflections*," *Early Music* 21 (1993): 625–33; Rob C. Wegman, "Reviewing Images," *Music and Letters* 76 (1995): 265–73; and Philip Weller, "Frames and Images: Locating Music in Cultural Histories of the Middle Ages," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 50 (1997): 7–54. See also Christopher Page, "A Reply to Margaret Bent," *Early Music* 22 (1994): 127–32; and Reinhard Strohm, "How to Make Medieval Music Our Own: A Response to Christopher Page and Margaret Bent," *Early Music* 22 (1994): 715–19.

7. Rob C. Wegman, "Sense and Sensibility in Late-Medieval Music: Thoughts on Aesthetics and 'Authenticity'," *Early Music* 23 (1995): 1–11; and Christopher Page, "Reading and Reminiscence: Tinctoris on the Beauty of Music," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 49 (1996): 1–31.

8. Arnold Schering, "Über Musikhören und Musikempfinden im Mittelalter," *Jahrbuch der Musikbibliothek Peters* (hereafter *JP*) 28 (1922): 41–56; Heinrich Besseler, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," *JP* 31 (1925): 35–52; Besseler, "Grundfragen der Musikästhetik," *JP* 33 (1927): 63–80; and Schering, "Historische und nationale Klangstile," *JP* 34 (1928): 31–43. See also Hermann Zenck, "Zarlino's 'Istitutioni harmoniche' als Quelle zur Musikanschauung der italienischen Renaissance," *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* 12 (1930): 540–78, esp. 573–78.

9. Moreover, in its most extreme form, the aesthetic of musical autonomy, which prevailed during these same decades, may end up denying the relevance of listeners and listening altogether. This was the upshot of, for instance, August Halm's essay "Programmusik und absolute Musik" of 1928, according to which music need not be specifically aimed at any listener at all but can exist "just as the sun and stars, which radiate in accordance with their nature, irrespective of whether they shine upon humans, animals or plants, or on desert sand and into empty space" (my trans.); see August Halm, *Von Form und Sinn der Musik: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, ed. Siegfried Schmalzriedt (Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Hartel, 1978), 68.

10. On this, see also the opening chapter, "Alte Musik und Gegenwart," of Heinrich Besseler, *Die Musik des Mittelalters und der Renaissance* (Wiesbaden: Athenaion, 1931, reprint 1979), 1–24. For the general climate in German musicology after World War I, see Pamela Potter, "Musicology Under Hitler: New Sources in Context," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 49 (1996): 73–80.

11. "Wobei nicht übersehen sei, daß Historie heute etwas anderes bedeutet als noch vor 20 Jahren, daß sie ganz allgemein zu einer problematischen Angelegenheit ersten Ranges geworden ist. Wenn unsere Grundanschauung an Stelle der früher vorausgesetzten eindimensionalen Entwicklung der Musik nunmehr eine Vielheit gleichberechtigter, auf ihren Wert hin gar nicht sinnvoll vergleichbarer Epochen sieht und die Idee eines zeitlosen, ewig gleichen Musikalisch-Schönen abgetan hat, so erwächst der Musikästhetik die Pflicht, daraus die Folgerungen zu ziehen. Die Zeit der Systeme ist vorüber." Besseler, "Grundfragen der Musikästhetik," 64.

12. "Die Zeit jener ästhetischen Systeme ist vorüber, welche das Schöne nur in Bezug auf die dadurch wachgerufene 'Empfindungen' betrachtet haben." Eduard Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen: Ein Beitrag zur Revision der Ästhetik der Tonkunst* (1854; reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 1.

13. "Nowadays we can scarcely understand how our grandparents could regard some particular musical sequence as a precisely corresponding impression of a particular state of feeling. Evidence for this is the extraordinary difference between the reactions of Mozart's, Beethoven's, and Weber's contemporaries to their compositions and our own reaction today . . . Nevertheless, throughout this variation in the impression of feeling, the musical value of many works remains in itself for us unaltered, their originality and beauty remaining as fresh as ever despite the excitement they might at one time have caused." Quoted after Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful*, trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986), 6–7; see also 38–40, 62–63.

14. "Als Hugo Riemann seine Doktordissertation von 1873 'Über das musikalische Hören' schrieb, stand er inmitten der glücklichen Selbstverständlichkeit einer geschlossenen musikalischen Tradition. Ein so allgemeines Thema konnte damals ohne weiteres auf Grundfragen der klassisch-romantischen Harmonik führen . . . Zu tief hat sich die musikalische Lage inzwischen gewandelt. Eine irgendwie geschlossene Tradition

ist nicht mehr vorhanden . . . Insofern unterscheidet sich freilich das gegenwärtige Aufgreifen fremder Musikkulturen von der romantischen Palestrina- und Bachbewegung, als uns die naive Sicherheit fehlt, das Vergangene mit gutem Gewissen den heutigen Gewohnheiten anzugleichen." Besseler, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," 35.

15. "[Daß] wir alle Ursache haben, uns den Unterschied zwischen den Art zu hören vor Jahrtausenden und der heutigen möglichst klein vorzustellen und allem mit ernstem Mißtrauen zu begegnen, was geignet scheint, dieses Fundament zu erschüttern"; quoted after Bernhard Dopheide, "Einleitung," in *Musikhören*, ed. Bernhard Dopheide (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975), 5–6.

16. Cf. Rose Rosengard Subotnik, "On Grounding Chopin," in *Music and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance, and Reception*, ed. Richard Leppert and Susan McClary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 105–31, esp. 105–6.

17. Besseler acknowledged this in the opening lines of his study *Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit*, Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Phil.-hist. Klasse 104, Hft. 6 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1959), 5; reprinted in Heinrich Besseler, *Aufsätze zur Musikästhetik und Musikgeschichte* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1978), 104–73: "How one listens to music: that is what became a problem in the nineteenth century. Hugo Riemann was the first to perceive it" (my trans.). In the subsequent pages Besseler acknowledged Riemann's positive contribution in his identification of "music listening" as a fundamental, logical activity of the human mind, at a time when it was described as a mere physiological process in Hermann Helmholtz's influential *Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen* (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1863). On the debates following the publication of Helmholtz's work, see Leon Botstein, "Time and Memory: Concert Life, Science, and Music in Brahms's Vienna," in *Brahms and His World*, ed. Walter Frisch (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 3–22, esp. 9–20.

18. "An der Haltung eines Tänzers oder auch nur eines unmittelbar beteiligten Zuschauers fällt sogleich auf, daß die Musik für ihn keineswegs im Mittelpunkt steht. Er hört nur mit halbem Ohr hin . . . Und ähnlich wie hier zwischen Musik und Hörern eine uns gewohnte Distanz zu fehlen scheint, so verschmelzen auch die sonst fest umrissenen Einzelpersonen zu einer Art von rhythmisch-vitalem Kollektivdasein, durch das die Musik als verbindendes Fluidum hindurchströmt. Es liegt auf der Hand, daß ein bloßer Beobachter nicht den angemessenen Zugang zu dieser Musik hat, insofern er eben nicht 'mitmacht'." Besseler, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," 38.

19. "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," 45.

20. See, for instance, Edmund A. Bowles, *Musikleben im 15. Jahrhundert*, Musikgeschichte in Bildern 3, Lfg. 8 (Leipzig: VEB Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1977). The only illustration in this book in which an individual appears to be listening attentively is an Italian etching from around 1480, now in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts (94–95). See, however, Christopher Page, "Listening to the Trouvères," *Early Music* 25 (1997): 640, for an illustration of ca. 1350 showing King Arthur and his court listening to a singer accompanying himself on a gittern: "Every gaze is directed to the performer, separated from his listeners by a small and (to the modern eye) instantly recognizable space."

21. Gay, *The Naked Heart*, 11–35.

22. Howard Mayer Brown, "Songs After Supper: How the Aristocracy Entertained Themselves in the Fifteenth Century," in *Musica Privata: Die Rolle der Musik im privaten

Leben, Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Walter Salmen, ed. Monika Fink, Rainer Gstrein, and Günter Mössmer (Innsbruck: Helbling, 1991), 40.

23. See also Besseler, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," 41. For an interesting cross-cultural perspective on the issue of attentiveness in listening to music, see Wim van Zanten, "Inner and Outer Voices: Listening and Hearing in West Java," *World of Music* 39 (1997): 41–49.

24. "Gebrauchsmusik kennt keinen Ewigkeitsmaßstab, wird von vornherein nicht in der Absicht auf Dauer geschaffen. Am lebendigsten ist sie dort, wo sie aus dem Augenblick für den Augenblick entsteht. Improvisation oder Auflösung und Veränderung allzu ausgefahrener Gleise sind hier angemessene Verfahren, die auch im Jazz eine Erneuerung gefunden haben. Der Komponist tritt völlig zurück, Name und Person sind belanglos. Er betreibt seine Sache als Handwerk oder Geschäft, ohne auf Originalität Wert zu legen." Besseler, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," 39.

25. Hans Joachim Moser, "Zwischen Kultur und Zivilisation," *Deutsches Musikjahrbuch* 4 (1926): 29.

26. See Alfred Einstein, "Bücherschau," *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* 9 (1926–27): 113; Heinrich Besseler, "Studien zur Musik des Mittelalters: II. Die Motette von Franko von Köln bis Philipp von Vitry," *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 8 (1927): 145 n2, and the communications by Moser and Besseler in the same volume, 380–81.

27. "Die Musikgeschichte zeigt jedoch die bemerkenswerte Tatsache, daß auch die führende Kunstmusik sehr häufig rein umgangsmäßig bestimmt ist, und daß im ganzen genommen das umgangsmäßige Musizieren viel weitere Gebiete und Zeiträume beherrscht als die nur vereinzelt auftretende eigenständig ausgeformte Musik." Besseler, "Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens," 48.

28. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music*, trans. Carolyn Abbate (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 140–42.

29. Besseler, *Das musikalische Hören der Neuzeit*; Fellerer's article was published in *Der Wandel des musikalischen Hörens*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für neue Musik und Musikerziehung Darmstadt 3 (Berlin: Merseburger, 1962), 7–13.

30. See, for example, Margaret Bent's historical postulate of "informed and prepared listening, whether by creators or performers or by those who listen with attention but without participation," which is both the a priori premise and the outcome of her analysis of a Vitry motet in "Polyphony of Texts and Music in the Fourteenth-Century Motet: *Tribum que non abhorruit/Quoniam secta latronum/Merito hec patimur* and Its 'Quotations'," in *Hearing the Motet: Essays on the Motet of the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, ed. Dolores Pesce (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 100 n1, 82. Besides this, the possibility exists that the "implicit listener" as uncovered through analysis was in fact a projection made by the composer and may tell us less about actual listeners in history than about authorial intentions. See Helga de la Motte-Haber, "Der einkomponierte Hörer," in *Der Hörer als Interpret*, ed. Helga de la Motte-Haber and Reinhard Kopiez (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1995), 35–41; for the same issue in literature, see Walter J. Ong, "The Writer's Audience Is Always a Fiction," *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America* 90 (1975): 9–21.

31. "Man durchdenke die Schwierigkeit des allereinfachsten Falles: daß ein Sänger des Jahres 950 gezwungen gewesen wäre, ohne Noten, lediglich auf sein Gehör gestützt, zu einer erklingenden Hauptstimme eine den Regeln entsprechende Gegenstimme zu improvisieren." Schering, "Über Musikhören und Musikempfinden im Mittelalter," 50.

32. See Walter Wiora, "Zwischen Einstimmigkeit und Mehrstimmigkeit," in *Festschrift Max Schneider zum achtzigsten Geburtstage*, ed. Walther Vetter (Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1955), 319–34.

33. For all my admiration of James Johnson's *Listening in Paris*, this problem seems to crop up in his book as well, as on p. 3: "Set in the stream of time, listening becomes a dialectic between aesthetic expectations and musical innovations. It is a continuous negotiation conducted at the boundaries of musical sense. Change occurs when music accessible enough to meet listeners' criteria for meaning is at the same time innovative enough to prod them into revising and expanding those assumptions." Similarly: "[w]ays of listening are cumulative. Musical innovations supplement the store of aesthetic possibilities over time" (282). Arno Forchert has cited evidence from this very period that suggests that works, conversely, "reacted to the expectations aroused by the mode of reception"; see his "'Ästhetischer' Eindruck und kompositionstechnische Analyse: Zwei Ebenen musikalischer Rezeption in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts," in *Rezeptionsästhetik und Rezeptionsgeschichte in der Musikwissenschaft*, ed. Hermann Danuser and Friedhelm Krummacher, Publikationen der Hochschule für Musik und Theater Hannover 3 (Laaber: Laaber, 1991), 200–201.

34. Rob C. Wegman, "From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low Countries, 1450–1500," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 49 (1996): 409–79.

35. For an example, see Zofia Lissa, "On the Evolution of Musical Perception," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 24 (1965): 273–86, a translation of her article "Zur historischen Veränderlichkeit der musikalischen Apperzeption," in *Festschrift Heinrich Besseler zum sechzigsten Geburtstag*, ed. Karl-Marx-Universität, Leipzig (Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1961), 475–88. Lissa's wide-ranging study speculates about modes of listening throughout Western history but assumes for all style periods that the central aim or problem was to guarantee "musical integration" of one sort or another and takes it as accepted that listening always involved a preoccupation with this typically analytic concern.

36. "Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: A Critique of Schoenberg, Adorno, and Stravinsky," in *Explorations in Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Essays in Honor of Leonard B. Meyer*, ed. Eugene Narmour and Ruth A. Solie (Stuyvesant: Pendragon Press, 1988), 104.

37. See, for example, Margaret Bent, "The Grammar of Early Music: Preconditions for Analysis," in *Tonal Structures in Early Music*, ed. Cristle Collins Judd (New York: Garland Publishing, 1998), 15–59, esp. 39–54. One problem with this article is that its various pronouncements as to what constitutes valid or appropriate analysis are tautologically dependent on the author's a priori understanding of analysis, which is itself kept out of the discussion. That understanding is not without its problems. For example, just to presuppose, as Bent does, that analysis must aspire to objective validity is unlikely in itself to secure a firm basis of consensus with her readers, given that this very ideal has been questioned by a wide range of authors. See, for example, Nicholas Cook, *A Guide to Musical Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 215–33. Similarly, it is unclear why the reader should accept her premise that analysis depends for its "validity" on the avoidance of anachronism, given that it is itself an anachronistic procedure to begin with. Bent's further contention that her "preconditions" can be met by recourse to contemporary theory raises other issues. For example, although she mentions in passing Peter Schubert's essay "Authentic Analysis," *Journal of Musicology* 12 (1994): 3–18, Bent fails to engage with its central argument, which is that attempts to ground

analysis in contemporary music theory usually amount simply to pushing the "problem" of anachronistic interpretation to another place, from the composition to a treatise. It is in that other place where the problem tends to return with a vengeance—which is why Schubert called attention to Bernhard Meier's reading of sixteenth-century modal theory, and why Bent's argument is vulnerable with regard to its analysis of medieval counterpoint teachings. Briefly stated, that analysis involves the very kinds of anachronisms of which she seeks to rid the analysis of music. For example, the elaborate use of grammar (in a modern rather than the medieval sense) as a metaphor for counterpoint constitutes an act of interpretation which is as invalid as anachronistic analysis (by Bent's standards) so long as the usage remains unsupported by theoretical evidence. Similarly, Bent's repeated insistence on "historically-informed technical validity" (22) involves a criterion that lacks historically informed validity, as her decisions as to what is "purely technical" in music are not so much based on medieval theory (which had no counterpart for this criterion) as they are determined by the anachronistic requirements of modern analysis. The problem in the latter case becomes especially worrisome later on, when Bent advances a number of claims about "appropriate" and "inappropriate" ways of hearing polyphony: these claims turn out to be based almost exclusively on the kinds of evidence she has chosen to identify as "technical" in medieval music theory, so that her argument oddly begins to sound like Adorno on listening to dodecaphony. (There is little in this discussion to suggest, for example, that medieval theorists frequently referred to the sensuous qualities or the psychophysical effects of music.) As it happens, it is far from certain that the "technical" precepts for making counterpoint carried any necessary implications for listening, as Bent appears to assume: Richard Crocker, in his article "Discant, Counterpoint, and Harmony," *Journal of the American Musicological Society* 15 (1962): 9, warns against making just that assumption.

38. *Zeitschrift für Musikwissenschaft* 9 (1927): 610–19.

39. Stern, "Zur Phänomenologie des Zuhörens," 610–11.

40. "Erstens ist es (geschichtsontologisch) fraglich, ob überhaupt einem historischen Objekte jeweils ein (und nur ein) Zugang eigne. Beweist nicht die doppelte Tatsache, daß Historisches—und zwar bei verschiedensten Zugängen—*bleibt*, und daß dies Bleiben ja die Historizität des historischen Gegenstandes ausmacht, die Un[an]gemessenheit, nach einem *einzigen* bevorzugten Zugang zu suchen?" Stern, "Zur Phänomenologie des Zuhörens," 610.

41. On the general issue of transmission, adaptation, and corruption, see Rob C. Wegman, "*Miserere supplicanti Dufay*: The Creation and Transmission of Guillaume Dufay's *Missa Ave regina celorum*," *Journal of Musicology* 13 (1995): 18–54, esp. 50–54.

42. "Schon ein halbes Jahrhundert Abstand genügt, um den Sinn einer Komposition im Prisma des veränderten Seelenlebens verändert erscheinen zu lassen, und noch stärker, ja bis zur völligen Umdeutung macht sich der Unterschied bemerkbar, sobald Jahrhunderte dazwischen liegen." Schering, "Über Musikhören und Musikempfindung," 41.

43. "[D]aher wir denn wohl auch die meisten theoretisch idealen Lösungen des Wiederbelebungsproblems, wenn solche überhaupt denkbar sind, als praktisch unannehmbar ablehnen würden." Schering, "Über Musikhören und Musikempfindung," 41.

44. On this issue in general, see Peter Gülke, "Interpretation und die Wandlungen des musikalischen Hörens," in Carl Dahlhaus, et al., *Bericht über den internationalen musikwissenschaftlichen Kongress Leipzig 1966* (Kassel: Bärenreiter, and Leipzig: Deutscher Verlag für Musik, 1970), 487–89.

45. Nicholas Cook, *Music, Imagination, and Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

46. This theory is admittedly based on a reading of medieval treatises, though it involves such severe problems of interpretation as to make it untenable in this form. See Gilbert Reaney, "Fourteenth-Century Harmony and the Ballades, Rondeaux, and Virelais of Guillaume de Machaut," *Musica Disciplina* 7 (1953): 129–46, for its classic formulation.

47. Cf. Lawrence Kramer, "The Politics and Poetics of Listening," *Current Musicology* 50 (1992): 62–67.

48. Peter J. Rabinowitz, "Chord and Discourse: Listening Through the Written Word," in *Music and Text: Critical Inquiries*, ed. Steven Paul Scher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 38–56. "Discursive practices" is a somewhat awkward term, but at least it can do justice to the rich diversity of expressions about musical experience that one finds in different cultures and historical periods. For a particularly thought-provoking sample of such testimonies, see Treitler, 14–17.

49. Christopher Page, "Listening to the Trouvères."